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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2331 
___________ 
 
CLARENCE J. ROBINSON, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
REGIONAL DIRECTOR J.L. NORWOOD;  
WARDEN B.A. BLEDSOE; HARRELL WATTS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3:11-cv-00631) 
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 18, 2013 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed August 13, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se Appellant Clarence J. Robinson appeals the District Court’s order granting 
Appellees’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment and 
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denying his motions to amend.  For the reasons set forth below, will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
I. 
 Because we primarily write for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has established Special Management 
Units (“SMUs”) at some of its institutions for the purpose of managing certain types of 
inmates who present security risks or management concerns.  In June 2009, while 
confined at USP-Victorville, in Victorville California, Robinson was recommended for 
placement in the SMU based on his extensive disciplinary history, including instances 
related to the possession of a weapon, possession of intoxicants, and engaging in sexual 
acts.  Robinson was notified that he had been referred for placement in the SMU and that 
a hearing would be held to determine whether referral was appropriate.  Robinson 
appeared at the August 2009 hearing via telephone-conference and he did not present any 
documentary evidence or witness statements.  The Hearing Administrator concluded that 
Robinson met the following criteria for SMU designation:  (1) “The inmate has a history 
of serious and disruptive disciplinary infractions;” and (2) “The inmate otherwise 
participated in or was associated with activity such that greater management of the 
inmate’s interaction with other persons is necessary to ensure the safety, security, or 
orderly operation of the Bureau facilities or protection of the public.”    
 On March 1, 2010, Robinson was transferred to USP-Lewisberg and placed in the 
SMU.  He filed an administrative grievance contesting his SMU placement, which was 
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denied.  In April 2011, Robinson filed a Bivens
1
 against BOP Northeast Regional 
Director J.L. Norwood, BOP National Inmate Appeals Administrator Harrell Watts, and 
Warden B.A. Bledsoe, alleging that his constitutional rights had been violated in 
connection with his SMU placement.  The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint or, 
alternatively, for summary judgment.  Robinson filed three motions to amend the 
complaint.  The District Court granted the defendants’ motion and denied Robinson’s 
motions to amend.  Robinson timely appealed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of 
a district court’s order granting or denying summary judgment, applying the same 
standard as the district court.  See Tri–M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 
2011).  We will affirm only if “drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id.  We may summarily affirm the 
District Court’s decision if the appeal presents no substantial question.  See L.A.R. 27.4; 
I.O.P. 10.6. 
III. 
 Robinson argues that his placement in the SMU at USP-Lewisburg violated his 
constitutional rights.  However, to the extent that he is alleging a violation of the Due 
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 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971). 
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Robinson’s placement in the SMU did not 
constitute a dramatic departure from the accepted standards for conditions of confinement 
such that due process was implicated.  See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).  
Transfers from lesser to more restrictive units in a prison generally do not implicate a 
protected liberty interest because some incursions on liberty are to be expected within a 
prison.  Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485.  See also Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(transfer to Security Threat Group Management Unit (“STGMU”), through which gang 
leaders are identified and isolated, taught non-violent conflict resolution, and released 
back into the general population upon successful completion of the program, does not 
implicate protected liberty interest).  Due process concerns arise when the conditions of 
confinement impose “atypical and significant hardship[s] on the inmate in relation to the 
ordinary incidents of prison life.”  Id.  Placement in administrative segregation for days 
or months at a time does not implicate a protected liberty interest.  See Torres v. Fauver, 
292 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2002) (no liberty interest in avoiding 120 days of administrative 
custody); Griffin, 112 F.3d at 706 (conditions in administrative segregation do not 
impose “atypical or significant hardship”).    
 Here, there is nothing in the record that the BOP’s basis to transfer Robinson to 
the SMU was improper, nor are there any facts to suggest that Robinson’s placement in 
the SMU subjected him to “atypical or significant hardship.”  See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 
484.  Robinson’s placement in the SHU at USP-Lewisburg was within “the ordinary 
incidents of prison life” and, thus, did not violate his constitutional rights.  See Torres v. 
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Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 150-51 (3d Cir. 2002); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.2d 703, 706-08 
(3d Cir. 1997).
2
   
 Additionally, to the extent that Robinson alleges a violation of his Eighth 
Amendment rights, he has not demonstrated (1) that his placement in the SMU resulted in 
the denial of any basic human need, (2) that he was “incarcerated under conditions posing 
a substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994), or 
(3) that prison officials demonstrated a “deliberate indifference” to his health or safety.  
Id.  Accordingly, there is no basis for relief and summary judgment was proper. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
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 Regardless of whether Robinson had a liberty interest, he was afforded a hearing before 
he was placed in the SMU and there are no allegations that he did not receive the process 
he was due. 
3
 We agree with the District Court’s decision to deny Robinson’s motions to amend the 
complaint.  
